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ROBERT L. SCHARFF*

A Common Tragedy: Condemnation
and the Anticommons
ABSTRACT
Economic development of land may be suboptimal where multiple
parties have the legal right to exclude use of the property in
question. Michael Heller labeled this phenomenon the "anticommons." Some argue that condemnation of private propertyfor
economic development is a potentiallyefficiency-enhancingsolution
to the anticommons problem. Until recently, this argument was
largely academic; however, with the recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Kelo v. City of New London, condemnationfor economic
development is now a validpolicy choice. In this article,Iargue that
the economic models used to justify condemnation are fundamentally flawed, and that the use of condemnation for economic
development encroachesupon autonomy interests withoutguaranteeing the promotion of efficiency interests.
INTRODUCTION
Federal, state, and local government bodies have used the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to justify the acquisition of land for a
growing list of public uses. Most recently, in Kelo v. City of New London, the
city of New London, Connecticut, succeeded in convincing the Supreme
Court to recognize the validity of a taking made solely for the promotion of
economic development, without a reasonable certainty of public benefit.1
In Kelo, the city claimed for development a 90-acre section of waterfront
consisting of 115 individual parcels.2 It is presumed that without
condemnation a project of this size in an already-developed city would not
be possible because holdout problems and other transaction costs are likely
to lead to 3what Michael Heller has termed the "tragedy of the anticommons."

* Robert Scharff has a Ph.D. in Economics from Duke University and a J.D. from George
Mason University, is a fellow of the Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies in the
Moritz College of Law at Ohio State University, and is an Assistant Professor in the Consumer
Sciences Department at Ohio State University. Thanks are due to Steven J. Eagle for his helpful
comments and guidance on early drafts of this article.
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655,2666 (2005).
2. Id. at 2659.
3. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Propertyin the Transitionfrom Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998).
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Heller posits that a "tragedy" occurs because too many people have
rights of exclusion over the use of a specified piece of property.4 He views
the difficulty involved in coordinating the actions of the multiple owners to
reintegrate the property as a prohibitively high transaction cost.'
Oftentimes, the result is that the costs of coordination exceed the gains from
unified action, leading to a failure to implement potential welfareenhancing improvements.6 The Kelo decision opens up new opportunities
for cities wishing to use condemnation as a means for overcoming the
anticommons problem. At the same time, because the Court greatly
expanded the state's power to take private property, the wisdom of doing
so deserves increased scrutiny at the policy level.
I begin this article by examining the nature of anticommons
problems. Next, I critique the current economic treatment of condemnation
as being overly simplistic and, as a result, biased against legitimate
idiosyncratic value. I conclude by examining the desirability of alternative
mechanisms designed to mitigate or eliminate anticommons problems.
I. THE NATURE OF ANTICOMMONS PROBLEMS
The anticommons problem is a simple concept with a number of
complicating variations. In this section, I examine the nature of
anticommons problems. First, I describe how legal and economic theorists
have studied the anticommons. Next, I explain that the basis of all theories
regarding the anticommons is the disintegration of property. Finally, I
examine the types of anticommons, including a discussion of both spatial
and legal anticommons.
A. Defined and Studied
The anticommons is defined simply as the inefficient use of a
specified piece of property that arises when multiple parties have the right
to exclude all others from using that property, either in part or in whole. In
a sense, the anticommons is the mirror image of the commons, which occurs
when multiple owners have an unlimited right to use a limited resource.7

4. Id. at 668, 676.
5. See id. at 673-74.
6. See id. at 669.
7. For a discussion of the symmetry between the tragedy of the commons and the
tragedy of the anticommons, see James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies:
Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3-4 (2000). See also Francesco Parisi et al., Duality
in Property: Commons and Anticommons 1-2 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper
No. 00-32, 2000), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=224844
[hereinafter Parisi et al., Duality].
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Whereas a commons typically results in the overutilization of the shared
resource, an anticommons generally results in the underutilization of the
shared resource.
Anticommons can be manifested in a number of ways. Heller
largely focuses on legal anticommons, defined as any instance in which
multiple parties have the legal right to exclude others from using any
portion of a piece of property.' Heller also recognizes spatial anticommons,
which occur when the physical subdivision of a piece of property reduces
the aggregate value of the property. As an extreme example, Heller
describes how Quaker Oats gave away twenty-one million one square inch
parcels of land in cereal boxes, rendering the land useless (until failure to
pay taxes led to the reversion of the land to the Canadian government).' In
both cases, an anticommons tragedy will occur if either the transaction costs
of assembling all of the rights/ parcels exceed the expected increase in value
from doing so, or there are holdouts seeking to extract some or all of the
rents to be gained from the integration of the property.
The concept of the anticommons has quickly gained a foothold
within the economic community since Heller published The Tragedy of the
Anticommons in 1998. Nobel Laureate James Buchanan introduced the first
formal economic model of the anticommons in 2000.10 As a result, the
concept of the anticommons is currently gaining ground among economists
as well as legal theorists.
Two economic models of the anticommons have recently emerged.
James Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon have utilized a simple profit
maximization function in which third parties must pay two or more coowners for the use of a piece of property.11 Because each co-owner sets a
price to maximize profits (and one assumes that the co-owners cannot
independently coordinate their actions), the resulting aggregate price for
entry is inefficiently high, and the property is underutilized. 12
Alternatively, Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schultz, and Ben Depoorter
have modeled the anticommons by supposing that two owners of distinct
pieces of land choose the extent to which they will devote their land to a
joint project. 13 Because neither party fully internalizes the marginal value of
their contribution, the parties will contribute land at an inefficiently low
rate, thus rendering the size of the resulting project suboptimal. 4

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
175, 178
14.

See Heller, supra note 3, at 656.
See id. at 682-84.
See Buchanan & Yoon, supranote 7, at 5-10.
Id. at 8-10.
Id. at 10.
Francesco Parisi et al., Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons, 17 EUR. J.L. & ECON.
(2004).
Id. at 179-80.
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Of course, the inefficiencies caused by anticommons are not new.
Thomas Grey and Thomas Merrill discussed the problems associated with
the physical and legal disintegration of property long before Heller
popularized the term "anticommons." 5 Similarly, Hernando de Soto has
built a career out of exposing the inefficiencies caused by the exclusionary
rights of overlapping bureaucracies in Latin America.16 As Buchanan notes,
what is useful about analyzing these phenomena as "anticommons" is that
"the anticommons construction offers an analytical means of isolating
a
17
central feature of sometimes disparate institutional structures."
B. The Basis for the Anticommons Problem: The Disintegration of
Property
Anticommons problems result from the inefficient division of
property among multiple persons. Any search for a solution to such a
problem must also identify the cause of the problem. While commentators
agree that disintegration of property has increased over time, there is some
disagreement over the cause of such disintegration and whether it is
inevitable in a capitalist economy.
Thomas Grey claims that the disintegration of property
accompanying industrialization has transformed property from a concept
best described as "thing-ownership" into something best described as a
"bundle of rights."1 8 Grey suggests that the disintegration of property is
"internal to the development of capitalism itself." 9 Similarly, Francesco
Parisi argues that property is subject to a fundamental law of entropy that

15. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property,in PROPERTY 69, 74-79 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (discussing the effect of industrialization on the
disintegration of property); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
61, 74 (1986) (proposing that an economic model be used to determine when the use of eminent
domain is an appropriate means to aggregate disintegrated properties).
16. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE EcONOMIc ANSWER TO TERRORISM
xviii-xix (Basic Books 2002) (1989) (discussing, inter alia, how bureaucratic hurdles involving
both legitimate and corrupt exactions kept most persons from operating a legitimate business
in Peru).
17. Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 7, at 12.
18. Grey, supranote 15, at 69, 73. Steven J. Eagle notes that both of these definitions are
ripe for criticism and posits that property interests are most accurately described as those
rights that "are 'created' and 'defined' by 'existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law....." STEVEN J.EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 80 (2nd ed.
2001) (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,161 (1980)). Despite
valid philosophical arguments against the general use of a bundle of sticks approach to
property rights, in this article, where necessary, I employ such an approach because it best
illustrates the issues involved in anticommons problems.
19. Grey, supra note 15, at 74.
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leads to the increased fragmentation of property.2' Parisi's account,
however, largely implicates the legal system facing market participants,
rather than the market itself.21 In both accounts, modem industrial
economies will likely see an increased disintegration in property over time
because economic gains exist from the subdivision of property along both
legal and spatial lines. 2 At the same time, these properties are unlikely to
be reintegrated even under optimal economic conditions because there are
significant transaction costs and strategic costs associated with reintegration23
of property that do not exist with respect to the fragmentation of property.
For example, while a single person can decide to subdivide and sell off
parcels from her own property, the reintegration of that property requires
the consent of all the new owners of the subdivided property. The mere fact
that multiple persons are involved in making a joint decision guarantees
that there will be some increased transaction costs in making the decision.
Additionally, obtaining consent involves overcoming the desire of each
party to maximize their share of the increased rents expected from
reunification of the property. This is the much-studied holdout problem
upon which proponents of condemnation for economic development have
fixated.24
While there is undoubtedly some truth to the disintegration and
entropy theories, Parisi has been careful to note that the legal system can,
and often does, include mechanisms to facilitate reunification without
condemnation.' In the next section, I examine the types of anticommons
that are likely to develop. I also discuss how the common law acts to
mitigate the harms from naturally occurring anticommons, but not
government imposed anticommons.

20. Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COM. L. 595, 595 (2002) [hereinafter
Parisi, Entropy].
21. See id. at 596. Parisi also examines the historical roots of legal rules that allow a single
parcel of land to be fragmented. J. at 596-613. He observes that, over time, Western legal
systems have shifted back and fo. t.t between legal regimes that treat real property as a unified
whole and those that allow for fragmentation of ownership rights. Id. The most recent period
during which a legal regime accepted horizontal fragmentation began early in the twentieth
century. See id. at 608.
22. Parisi, Entropy, supra note 20, at 627. See also Grey, supranote 15, at 74-76.
23. See Parisi, Entropy, supra note 20, at 595-96.
24. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 15, at 80.
25. Parisi, Entropy, supra note 20, at 613-21. Parisi describes reunification mechanisms in
the law as providing a "gravitational force" that acts to reintegrate fragmented property. Id.
at 613-14.
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C. Types of Anticommons: Spatial and Legal
Before one can adequately explore solutions to the anticommons
problem, it is important to look below the surface to determine the true
nature of any anticommons problem that may exist. Accordingly, it is first
necessary to identify the forms that the disintegration of property might
take. Heller groups anticommons property as being property that is either
spatially or legally disintegrated. 26 Legal anticommons can be further
classified as those caused by ownership disintegration, temporal
disintegration, or regulatory disintegration.
1. Spatial Anticommons
Spatial anticommons involve the familiar case of land that has been
physically subdivided to an extent greater than economic efficiency would
dictate.27 Inefficiency persists in these cases because the cost of
consolidating the exclusionary rights of each individual owner of a parcel
of land is greater than the increased rents the unification of the parcels is
expected to generate.
In most cases in which an anticommons problem has developed,
the contemporary decision to subdivide was an ex ante efficiencyenhancing decision given the alternative discounted streams of rents
expected under unified and fragmented property regimes.28 Only later do
the conditions in the community change in such a way as to affect the
calculus of efficiency. 29 Richard Epstein suggests that the initial decision to
divide a parcel incorporates both the probability that the future fragmented
property interests will not be reunified and the resulting potential losses of
value from the anticipated anticommons.3 ° Consequently, less
fragmentation of property occurs ex ante than would otherwise occur.
Nevertheless, Parisi reasons that there is likely to be more ex post
fragmentation than is socially optimal because the anticommons problem
makes it more difficult to remedy a mistaken ex ante decision to subdivide

26. See Heller, supra note 3, at 651, 656.
27. See generally Heller, supranote 3, at 685-87 (describing the difficulties that the federal
government encountered in solving the spatial anticommons problem when it converted
communal Native American reservations into privately held lands with limited alienability).
28. Parisi, Entropy, supra note 20, at 627.
29. Id.
30. See Richard A. Epstein, Notice andFreedom of Contractin the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1353, 1364-68 (1982) (arguing that, given a legal framework offering the right
incentives, sellers of servitudes will structure contracts to take into account future uses of the
property, the possibility of changed conditions, and the expected transaction costs involved
in reintegrating the property).
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than to remedy a mistaken ex ante decision to keep a parcel intact. 31 Of
course, the expected level of inefficient fragmentation from this process is
unlikely to be as high as Parisi suggests if the original seller is a rational
actor who factors the possibility of mistake into their calculations.
Spatial anticommons can exist by design. For example, conservation-minded local mountain-hiking clubs in Austria have purchased large
pieces of land, divided these large pieces into parcels that are too small for
economic development, and redistributed these smaller parcels to their
members.32 In this case, the Austrian clubs purposely created an
anticommons as a commitment mechanism to prevent future club leaders
from selling the land to developers.33 Whether this is a normatively good
strategy is open to question. However, at least two commentators advocate
the deliberate creation of anticommons as an effective strategy to combat a
perceived anti-conservation bias that exists among government planners. 4
Finally, as I alluded to above, some spatial anticommons may be the
result of mistake. It may be that a party created an anticommons based on
misperceptions or perverse incentives where ex ante efficiency criteria
would have dictated an alternative course of action. Heller presents the
example of komunalka apartments in the former Soviet Union.3 Designers
originally intended that these apartments accommodate multiple families,
each of which had exclusive rights to their bedrooms, but communal rights
to kitchens, bathrooms, and living areas.36 Under the Soviet system, the
efficiency of land use decisions was not a prime concern of the state. After
the fall of the Soviet Union, however, the price system became an important
determinant of resource allocation. It became more profitable to sell
37
komunalka apartments as a whole rather than to sell one's share in the unit.
Nevertheless, despite the presence of a well-defined anticommons problem
(each family could refuse to sell, thus negating the complementarities from
unification), the families reached an agreement and sold off the unified
properties at the higher price.' Heller concludes that, because spatial

31. Parisi et al., Duality, supra note 7, at 13. Parisi notes that, given a normal distribution
of errors in decisions to subdivide, the effect will be a cumulative increase in fragmented
property. Id. This occurs because an erroneous decision to keep a parcel unified is easily
correctible, while an erroneous decision to subdivide is subject to the anticommons problem.
Id.
32. Id. at 19-20.
33. Id.
34. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Propertyand Antiproperty, 102 MICH.
L. REV.1, 39 (2003) (suggesting "the name 'conservation commons' for commons whose most
efficient use is nonuse").
35. Heller, supra note 3, at 650-58.
36. Id. at 650-51.
37. Id. at 651-52.
38. See id. at 654.
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boundaries are well defined, spatial anticommons may be easier to
overcome than are legal anticommons problems, where the division of
rights is less certain.39
2. Legal Anticommons
The disintegration of property typically brings to mind the concept
of spatial anticommons. Legal anticommons, however, are perhaps more
important as an impediment to development, even where the issue has been
framed as a spatial anticommons problem. Legal anticommons emerge
when the legal rights to a particular parcel have been distributed among too
many parties.' ° In essence, the ownership of the bundle of rights that gives
individuals use of a piece of property becomes so fragmented that the value
of the property to its principal owner is severely diminished, perhaps to the
point of rendering the property valueless. What makes these forms of
disintegration particularly pernicious is the tendency for these rights to be
uncertain or poorly defined. Consequently, a developer hoping to acquire
land for a large project may acquire title to multiple properties, but still be
uncertain whether the rights she purchased include the right to develop the
project. The extent to which legal disintegration hampers use of property
depends on whether one further characterizes the resulting legal
disintegration as ownership, temporal, or regulatory.
a. Ownership Disintegration
Ownership disintegration can occur when more than one person
holds the title to a piece of land.41 For example, ownership disintegration
may arise when a parent conveys an estate to several of his or her children
in a will. If the children disagree about how their joint property is to be
used, an anticommons may develop. Fortunately, the common law handles
this prospect well. Courts have the ability to resolve these disputes by either
selling off the estate as a whole or subdividing the estate into pro rata
shares.42 The latitude given to courts in these cases allows for a balancing
of autonomy interests, which are advanced by keeping land within the
family, and efficiency interests, which may dictate the preservation of the

39. Id. at 656.
40. Id..
41. See id. at 635-40 (discussing how Moscow storefronts emptied after the fall of the
Soviet Union because multiple persons and organizations had ownership interests with rights
of exclusion).
42. See, e.g., Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27,30 (Conn. 1980) (holding that courts prefer
partition in kind, but a court will order partition by sale if it is in the best interests of the
parties); Johnson v. Hendrickson, 24 N.W.2d 914, 916 (S.D. 1946) (holding that a court will
order a partition sale when the "value of the share of each cotenant, in case of partition, would
be materially less than his share of the money equivalent that could probably be obtained for
the whole").
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estate in its unified form. Furthermore, the uncertainty inherently attached
to a court resolution limits each party's expected gain from being a holdout,
thereby increasing the co-owners' incentive to come to a voluntary private
agreement.
Ownership disintegration may also occur when property owners
voluntarily or involuntarily convey limited rights for others to use or
preclude use of their property. For example, the creation of an easement
across an individual's land by express grant, reservation, prescription, or
implication not only gives the easement holder the right to use part of the
individual's land, it also implicitly gives the holder the right to block
development that terminates the easement.43 To mitigate the potential
anticommons problems that may develop from this situation, the
Restatement of Property allows for the relocation of an easement to allow for
development of the servient estate if the change in the easement does not
unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement holder. 4 In addition,
courts may terminate easements upon abandonment of the easement or
discontinuation of the original purpose of the easement. 4 Richard Epstein
has argued that, even in the absence of these common law unification
mechanisms, most parties will efficiently convey servitudes because those
parties will incorporate future considerations into the servitude's original
sales contract. 46
Another form of ownership disintegration occurs when the law
gives an individual rights over her neighbors. For example, if an outdoor
music pavilion is built in a residential neighborhood, the residents of the
neighborhood may have the right to sue under nuisance law for an

43. See, e.g., Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 498 P.2d 987, 988 (Cal. 1972)
(holding that an easement may be created either by express grant or by reservation of the
easement at the time the servient property is sold); Van Sandt v. Royster, 83 P.2d 698, 702-03
(Kan. 1938) (finding an easement by implication where the easement affecting the dominant
estate was "apparent" even if not "visible"); Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 200
A. 646,652 (Pa. 1938) (discussing the assignability of a validly granted easement); Cmty. Feed
Store v. Ne. Culvert Corp., 559 A.2d 1068, 1070 (Vt. 1989) (noting that an easement by
prescription is created by "an adverse use or possession which is open, notorious, hostile and
continuous..., and acquiescence in the use or possession by the person against whom the claim
is asserted").
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERvITUDEs § 4.8(3) (2000); see also Huggins v. Wright,
774 So. 2d 408, 411-12 (Miss. 2000) (stating that a servient owner has the right to relocate an
easement by necessity); Lewis v. Young, 705 N.E.2d 649, 661-62 (N.Y. 1998) (folowing the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.8(3) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1994)).
45. See, e.g., Presault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525,1545-46 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding, on
the facts of the case, that the discontinued use of an easement for over ten years constituted
abandonment of the easement); Hopkins the Florist, Inc. v. Fleming, 26 A.2d 96, 98-99 (Vt.
1942) (terminating an easement that gave a dominant estate a view from its windows when the
dominant estate's structure was replaced with one without windows facing the easement).
46. Epstein, supranote 30, at 1364-68.
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injunction or damages if the volume of the music is unreasonable.47 To the
extent that an injunction is a possibility, the resulting anticommons problem
may prevent the construction of an efficiency-enhancing music pavilion.
However, a court could remedy this problem if it allowed for a damages
remedy in those cases in which economic development is efficiency
enhancing." Also, courts define nuisances, in part, based on whether or not
the activity at issue is efficiency enhancing. 49 As a result, nuisance law is
unlikely to be a significant source of anticommons problems.
b. Temporal Disintegration
Property may also be subject to temporal disintegration. 0 may
convey Blackacre to A for life and give the remainder to B. In this case, the
decision to sell Blackacre in fee simple would require that both A and B
agree to the sale if it occurs during A's lifetime."0 The problem is
compounded when the remainder of a life estate is given to an individual
not yet born. For example, 0 can convey a piece of property to A for life
with the remainder going to A's children alive at A's death. Because "A's
children alive at A's death" cannot be defined until A dies, there is no way
to agree to a substantive change in the property until A dies. In this event,
the authority to agree to an efficiency-enhancing sale of the property will
not exist until A dies. Note, however, that the Rule Against Perpetuities at
least somewhat limits the extent to which temporal disintegration may
occur.5 ' In any event, these types of arrangements are rare enough that
temporally disintegrated property is unlikely to halt most major projects.

47. See, e.g., Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378, 1381-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982)
(holding that noise alone can constitute a nuisance).
48. Although injunction is still the preferred remedy in nuisance suits, courts will
sometimes use damages when an injunction will lead to significant economic losses. See, e.g.,
Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 874-75 (N.Y. 1970) (holding that damages are
available when the economic losses from an injunction are substantial).
49. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that an intentional invasion is only unreasonable if "(a) the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct, or (b) the harm
caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar
harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979). See Rose, 453 A.2d at 1383 (enjoining the use of a personal
windmill because the social utility of the windmill did not outweigh the harm it created).
50. See, e.g., Riley v. Norfleet, 148 So. 777,781 (Miss. 1933) (denying specific performance
for the sale of a piece of property when the underage remaindermen were not in direct privity
with the purchaser of the property).
51. For a discussion of the Rule Against Perpetuities, see JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E.
KRIER, PROPERTY, 302-04 (5th ed. 2002) (describing how the Rule Against Perpetuities
extinguishes interests that are created more than 21 years after the death of a life in being at
the time the interest is created).
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c. Regulatory Disintegration
The final form of disintegration that may produce an anticommons
problem is regulatory disintegration. Government limitations on the
development of a piece of property effectively give legal interests in that
property to government agencies with the authority to block development
of that property. The government's interests are defined, in part, by zoning
laws, health and safety regulations, and environmental regulations. 2
In a sense, the government's interests are much like any other
interest in property that I have mentioned up to this point. Like the owner
of an easement, the government has the right to exclude any development
that encroaches upon its interest. The government may force a property
owner that constructs a building exceeding municipal height limitations by
nine feet to reduce the offending structure to meet existing standards.' Like
the neighbors who must bargain for joint use of a given piece of property,
the government may take exactions in exchange for ignoring technical
violations of its property right.' The government may allow a property
owner to build a house on a coastal highway that exceeds the dimensions
authorized under environmental regulations, so long as the property
owner, in exchange, provides amenities with a sufficient nexus that are
roughly proportional to the property right given up by the government.5
Three key features of regulatory disintegration distinguish it from
privately created forms of disintegration. First, those who enforce
regulations have different motivations than most private individuals do.
While private actors generally want to maximize the value of their assets to
themselves, regulators often have mixed motives ranging from idealistic to
political. As Heller notes, where the interests of rights holders diverge,
reunification of fragmented property will be more difficult.' Second, within

52. For example, "[hiousing permits require the approval of several separate overlapping
agencies." Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 7, at 11.
53. See Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 953 P.2d 1315, 1319-20 (Haw.
1998) (upholding a local administrative body's order to reduce the height of a Buddhist temple
that exceeded zoning limitations by approximately seven feet and exceeded authorization
given by building permits by nine feet).
54. See Jerold S. Kayden, Zoningfor Dollars:New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the
Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3-4 (1991)
(discussing how local governments leverage exactions from developers through "incentive
zoning").
55. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (limiting extortionary
exactions by requiring that there be an "essential nexus" between the exaction and the harm
caused by the violation necessitating the exaction). See also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374,388-91 (1994) (holding that an exaction under Nollan must exhibit "rough proportionality"
to the harm the exaction is designed to offset).
56. See Heller, supra note 3, at 655.
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a given community there is a defined set of regulations that a developer
must satisfy before she can begin development. The developer cannot
ignore a particularly intransigent regulator. Conversely, in dealing with
private landowners, the developer can choose between different sites in the
community, ultimately settling on a site where landowners are most
amenable to the developer's plans. Finally, while undisclosed agents can
57
assist in agreements between developers and private landowners,
sunshine laws' and due process 9 generally require that the government
make public all applications for permits and zoning changes. As a result, a
regulator that understands the rents that the unification of properties will
create can demand rent-dissipating exactions from the developer, while a
landowner confronted with an undisclosed agent will be likely to demand
a value closer to their reservation value for the property. Together, these
factors suggest that regulatory disintegration is a more serious problem
than spatial disintegration in the development of anticommons.
II. CONDEMNATION AS A SOLUTION TO THE
ANTICOMMONS PROBLEM
Understanding the nature of anticommons is the first step toward
finding a remedy for these problems. As a second step, it is important to
understand how strategic action and difficulties in employing analytical
techniques complicate the search for a solution to potential anticommons
problems. In this section, I examine these issues. First, I consider the
institutional barriers that developers face in trying to integrate disintegrated
properties. Next, I warn against using artificial concepts of efficiency in
formulating a response to the identified problems. Finally, I discuss how a
purported solution that relies on condemnation through the invocation of
eminent domain powers is, at best, a crude and inefficient solution to the
anticommons problem.
A. The Developer's Problem
A developer wishing to embark on a large project requiring the
integration of multiple parcels of land must structure a strategy for
development that both maximizes the chances for success and minimizes
the costs. Because regulatory agencies typically approve development

57. See ROBERTC. ELLICKSON & VIcKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 1029-38 (2nd ed. 2000)
(discussing how some states have enacted legislation requiring public agencies to carry out
deliberations in meetings open to the public).
58. Id. at 414-15.
59. See Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 217 A.2d 578, 586-87 (Md. 1966) (stating
that "interested person[s]" have a right to take part in zoning or reclassification decisions).
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projects over time in a public manner, developers cannot simultaneously
and instantaneously purchase land and seek regulatory approvals.'
Consequently, in the absence of condemnation, a developer may employ
two basic strategies.
One strategy is to use undisclosed agents to purchase contiguous
plots of land from private landowners before attempting to obtain the
necessary approvals from the various regulatory agencies.61 The advantage
of this strategy is that the surreptitious purchase of property minimizes the
chance that holdouts will act strategically to extract the rents of the project.62
To the extent that property owners are unwilling to sell or demand a price
above market value, these preferences reflect the true value of the property
to the owners. The problem with this strategy is that regulators understand
that the transaction costs incurred by the developer in acquiring the subject
properties are sunk costs. As a result, these regulators are able to command
a high price in exactions and may ultimately deny approval for the project.'
An alternative strategy is to obtain regulatory approvals before
acquiring the land needed. The results of this strategy are symmetric with
the results of the first strategy. In this case, assuming the regulators see
development as a net gain for their community, the developer can avoid
large exactions from the regulator by making a credible threat to take the
proposed development to a different municipality. However, because the
regulatory process is public and regulatory costs are sunk, the owners of the
targeted properties will rationally try to extract the assembly value of the
property from the developer.
In each of the aforementioned cases, the anticommons problem
facing the developer is a significant hurdle to overcome. Nevertheless,
where expected rents are sufficiently high, development occurs. 64 Many
commentators believe that in cases where development does not occur,
government action, in the form of condemnation, is needed to allow

60. This leads to an anticommons problem that Parisi has termed "sequential
anticommons." Parisi et al., supra note 13, at 181-82.
61. In 1974, Peter Hellman penned a behind-the-scenes account of how a private firm,
acting as an undisclosed agent, assembled a city block in New York City. ELLICKSON & BEEN,
supra note 57, at 1029-38.
62. See id. at 1030.
63. For example, despite the strictures placed on localities by Nollan and Dolan, the
California Supreme Court allowed Culver City to enforce exactions of $280,000 (as a
"recreation fee" to make up for the loss of private tennis courts that had previously been on
the site), $33,200 (as an "in lieu art fee" to make up for the lack of art on the proposed
property), and $30,000 (as an "in lieu 'parkland' fee") on a proposed townhouse development.
The total impact of these fees amounted to $11,440 per townhouse. Gideon Kanner, Tennis
Anyone? How CaliforniaJudgesMade Land Ransom and Art CensorshipLegal, 25 REAL EST.L.J. 214,
215 (1997).
64. See Ellickson & Been, supra note 57, at 1029-38.
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efficiency-enhancing projects to move forward. I argue below that this claim
is unavailing because it is based on an imprecise understanding of
efficiency, does not respect autonomy interests, and is prone to misuse.
B. Autonomy Versus Efficiency Criteria
Many commentators suggest that the solution to an identified
anticommons problem is to create legal institutions that facilitate the
reintegration of anticommons property.65 Some have even suggested that
it may be preferable to transform anticommons property into commons
property.' While these commentators may be correct in their identification
of the problem, the unmistakable conclusion that one draws from their
analyses is that there is a need to solve the problem. The trouble with
fixating on a need to solve the problem is that it naturally leads to
justifications for solutions under which one sacrifices autonomy interests in
the name of so-called efficiency interests. This is particularly troublesome
given the erosion of the concept of efficiency in law and economics
literature.
1. PosnerianLaw and Economics
The Chicago School of Law and Economics is especially culpable in
this respect. When Judge Richard Posner discarded utility theory in favor
of "wealth maximization" because of the impossibility of measuring
utility,67 he set the stage for the elimination of autonomy-based theories in
law and economics. Because of the impossibility of comparing utility across
individuals, the only legal changes possible under a utility-based
framework are those in which the change will lead to a Pareto superior
regime.' Therefore, Posner was undoubtedly correct in determining that it
is difficult, if not impossible, to use utility to determine efficiency-enhancing
changes in laws.
Posner's solution, the adoption of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency for policy
decisions, nominally respects autonomy interests because it allows for

65. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, Partition of Real Estate; Or, Breaking Up Is
(Not) Hard to Do, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 783, 783 (2000) (discussing how courts can solve
anticommons problems created by disagreements by joint owners of real property).
66. Sven Vanneste et al., From "Tragedy" to "Disaster": Welfare Effects of Commons and
Anticommons Dilemmas, 13 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 04-23,2004),
availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=556160 (giving the example
of a condominium complex creating a garden that is owned by all, but over which none have
the right of exclusion).
67. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-16 (6th ed. 2003).
68. See id. at 12-14.
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measurement of consumer surplus.6 9 However, there are two weaknesses
in Posner's approach. One is based on his definition of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, while the other is based on his attitude toward measurement
problems.
First, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, as defined by Posner, suggests that
a change in legal rights is efficient when the sum of willingness to pay
measures for those who gain from the change exceeds the sum of the
willingness to pay measures for those who lose.7' However, the economics
community accepts that an individual who has a right taken from her
suffers a loss in value greater than her willingness to pay for that right. At
a minimum, the constraints placed on that person by her limited ability to
pay creates an income (or wealth) effect that leads to a measurement for her
willingness to pay for acquisition of the right below her willingness to
accept compensation for loss of the right.7' Behavioral economics literature
identifies a number of other psychological factors that suggest the
difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept values can
be very large, possibly exceeding an order of magnitude for rights over
unique goods.72 Thus, an economist following Posner's prescription would
systematically exclude the excess value that a current property owner has
over other potential property owners.
A second problem with Posner's approach is that Posner counsels
analysts to avoid what he calls "complicationism."73 Posner suggests that it
may be better to err on the side of excessive reductionism rather than
excessive "complicationism" because it is impossible to include all relevant
factors in an economic analysis. 74 Posner suggests that this is not a problem
because the completeness of the theory can be validated based on its
explanatory power. 75 If empirical analysis supports the theory, the theory
must be good. The problem with this approach is that, when applied to
condemnation, the omission of idiosyncratic value from an economic model
is justified because empirical evidence demonstrates that people do actually
sell at market value. Thus, one can equate the value of the property to the
individual to the market value of the piece of property. Of course, under

69. Id. at 13,16.
70. Id.
71. See Robert D. Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 589,
591-92 (1976) (describing the effect of income on willingness-to-pay measures).
72. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi et al., An Investigationof the Rationalityof Consumer Valuations
of Multiple Health Risks, 18 RANDJ. ECON. 465,477-78 (1987) (discussing survey results showing
that the amount individuals would require in compensation for a risk increase of 1/10,000
from poisoning was nine times greater than the amount the individuals would be willing to
pay for a similar decrease in risk).
73. POSNER, supra note 67, at 17.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 17-18.
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basic economic theory, those that do not sell presumably have a subjective
value for their property that exceeds its market value.
Essentially, Posnerian analysis discards examination of the
subjective aspects of utility in favor of an analysis based only upon those
values that one can objectively measure. Posnerian analysis shunts aside
idiosyncratic values (the cornerstone of a free society) in favor of uniform,
market-based values. Once Posner removes the subjective nature of utility
from the equation, it is easy to calculate the costs and benefits associated
with alternative legal regimes and choose the one that maximizes social
welfare. Of course, by defining social welfare in that way, Posner strips the
term of any real meaning.
2. Hayekian Skepticism of Government
Posner's normative prescriptions differ markedly from those of
Friedrich Hayek, a renowned economist who also studied legal
institutions.76 Whereas Posner calls for activism based on the strength of
economic analysis, Hayek calls for restraint due to the limits of economic
analysis.' Hayek believes that the purpose of law should be limited to
facilitating "a spontaneous order of actions."78
History suggests that we should not organize the fundamental
institutions of society around current notions of what is efficient. In 1944,
when Hayek published The Road to Serfdom, the educated elite were
convinced that capitalism was a wasteful and inefficient means of
organizing society. 79 After all, why should industrialists be able to fritter
away potential gains from trade through wasteful competition or
monopolistic practices? The same could be said of disintegrated property.
Why should owners of small fragments of property be able to deny society
the potential rents that it could realize by integrating that property? The
answer, according to Hayek, is that central planning will fail because the
planners will never be able to collect and process the information the
market uses in its decentralized operation."0 Hayek was, at least outwardly,
vindicated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the lip service paid to
free markets in the United States by Republicans and Democrats alike. It is
far from clear whether our leaders will fritter away Hayek's legacy, as these
supposed defenders of capitalism continue to use Orwellian doublespeak

76. FRiEDiCH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME I: RULES AND ORDER
11-17 (1973).
77. Hayek recognizes that humans are necessarily limited in what they can know,
regardless of the increasing power of analytic tools. Id.
78. Id. at 112.
79. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 43-55 (1944).
80. Id.
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to promote "capitalism" through the heavy hand of government planning,
especially in the realm of land use regulation.
Hayek essentially exposed the problems associated with measuring
efficiency. Given these problems, any acceptable legal solution should first
protect autonomy interests before pursuing efficiency interests.
C. The False Promise of Condemnation
In the last few decades, a number of courts have read the public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment to allow the government to condemn
land for private development. 8 The Supreme Court first opened the door
to these types of condemnations in Berman v. Parker, which effectively
allowed the government to use eminent domain to remedy any social ill
within the scope of its police power.82 The Court affirmed Berman in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff.83 In that case, the Court allowed for the
redistribution of lands from landowners to their tenants because of the
perceived harms resulting from a land oligopoly that existed at the time.'
In the interim, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit,stretched the public use clause to its farthest extent
yet by finding that condemnation for economic development alone was a
permissible exercise of eminent domain power.' Although the Supreme
Court of Michigan recently overturned Poletown on state constitutional
grounds,86 the U.S. Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of New London, validated
Poletown'sexpansive definition of public use under the U.S. Constitution by
a 5-4 vote.87 Nevertheless, in his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy suggests that courts should take rational basis review seriously in
takings cases and should not hesitate to strike down takings that use the
economic development rationale as a pretext for other illicit purposes.' Of
course, this presumes that courts will be able to determine whether a
particular project is beneficial for economic development.
The problem with condemnation for development is that neither
courts nor legislatures have the ability to determine what course of action

81. The Fifth Amendment states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Legal commentators hotly debate the exact
meaning of the public use clause, but no consensus has emerged. See EAGLE, supra note 18, at
170-71.
82. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
83. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
84. Id. at 239-42.
85. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Mich.
1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
86. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787.
87. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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is likely to be economically efficient. Land use experts cite Thomas Merrill's
article on the economics of public use as a leading authority on the
economics of condemnation for public use.89 Merrill's work is also valuable
as an illustration of the futility of using economic analysis to micromanage
condemnation decisions.
Laudably, Merrill does not accept the proposition that courts
should give local legislatures complete deference in condemning land for
economic development.' Instead, he attempts to develop a framework for
determining when courts should allow condemnation solely for economic
development. 9 In his basic model, Merrill suggests that condemnation
should be available when the costs from market exchange (including
transaction costs and the expected private loss from the failure of exchange)
exceed the administrative costs of eminent domain proceedings.9 2 To his
credit, Merrill recognizes that his basic model is incomplete and may lead
to greater inefficiencies than were present in the absence of condemnation.93
In particular, Merrill notes that (1) "just compensation"94 does not include
subjective value; (2) where the market could solve the assembly problem on
its own, developers may engage in rent seeking to get the locality to use the
condemnation process on their behalf; and (3) developers may purposely
create a situation where condemnation is efficient by strategically passing
up the opportunity to use market mechanisms to acquire the land at an
earlier point in time.9" Merrill's solution for situations with these types of
issues is heightened judicial scrutiny. 96
The real weakness in Merrill's argument becomes apparent when
examining his definitions of heightened scrutiny. In the context of
subjective value, heightened scrutiny involves weighing the loss of
subjective value for those who will lose their properties against the
expected gains from condemnation. 97 Merrill expects judges to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis while, at the same time, recognizing that there is no
way of obtaining the information necessary to do a cost-benefit analysis!9"
Basically, Merrill expects judges to second-guess the conclusions of

89. ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 57, at 1018-19 (citing Merrill, supra note 15).
90. Merrill, supra note 15, at 64.
91. Id. at 74-93.
92. Id. at 81.
93. Id. at 81-89.
94. The Fifth Amendment requires that governments give "just compensation" as
restitution for a taking. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Nevertheless, as Steven Eagle notes, just
compensation is rarely full compensation. EAGLE, supra note 18, at 193.
95. Merrill, supra note 15, at 82-90.
96. Id. at 90. The Court explicitly rejected heightened scrutiny in Kelo v. City of New London,
125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667-68 (2005).
97. Merrill, supra note 15, at 84-85, 90.
98. Id.
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councilmen based on information that neither the councilmen nor the
judges have access to. This is the easy part. Merrill observes that the other
cases for heightened scrutiny (secondary rent seeking and intentional or
negligent thick market bypass) "require a more complex analysis.""
Despite Merrill's noble attempt to incorporate objections to
condemnation into his analysis, there are a number of important issues
Merrill did not address. First, what is the baseline used to analyze
efficiency? Cities and their corporate sponsors will argue that the gain from
condemnation is the difference between the value of the land at issue before
and after condemnation. However, it is equally plausible to assume that if
the project cannot go forward in the neighborhood at issue, the project (or
some other project utilizing the capital earmarked for the project) will go
forward somewhere else in the city, county, or country. Does a project that
would have generated $1 million in market value if it had been completed
in Denver, but instead generates $990,000 when it is actually completed in
San Antonio, really cost society $1 million because it was blocked in
Denver? What if the respective localities are the neighborhoods of Adams
Morgan and Anacostia, both located within the city of Washington D.C.? If
the owners of land have no right to the assembly value of their land, it does
not matter where the project is located. In that case, what matters is the
opportunity cost of the capital available for investment. In the above
example, the project will only be justifiable if the current landowner's loss
of subjective value is less than $10,000.
Next, when condemnation is readily available there is no incentive
for a speculator to maintain control over a large piece of land in anticipation
that the land may increase in value as an integrated whole. The potential
developer can avoid the inherent risks of speculation merely by waiting
until she is ready to develop a site and, at that time, using the machinery of
the government to assemble the land for her at reduced cost. Consequently,
where condemnation is readily available, the state will often have to use its
eminent domain power simply to maintain the same level of property
integration that would have existed in the absence of easy condemnation.
Theoretically, the net result could be large losses of idiosyncratic value with
no increase in land value.
Condemnation may also affect efficiency in a more subtle way. A
landowner faced with a regime that regularly uses condemnation for
economic development will rationally choose to forgo marginal projects
designed to increase the idiosyncratic aspects of consumer surplus.1°°

99. Id. at 90.
100. For example, ready condemnation reduces a homeowner's incentive to install a
swimming pool on his or her property because pools do not increase property value; however,
a swimming pool would unquestionably increase the homeowner's subjective value for the
property.
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Oftentimes, the improvements a landowner makes will have some aesthetic
appeal to passers by, though these improvements will have little effect on
market value. To the extent that most people find the resulting aesthetics
pleasing, there will be a loss of social welfare from the chilling effect caused
by the threat of condemnation. These distortionary effects are impossible to
measure, though they do lead to real losses of welfare for the individual
and the community.
Finally, condemnation, in effect, eliminates spatial disintegration
by increasing legal disintegration. If condemnation is readily available, the
government will have a de facto option on every piece of property subject
to its authority. While the anticommons problem (if there was one to begin
with) may be solved, and one form of market failure is theoretically
eliminated, the door is opened for much more destructive forms of
government failure. Autonomy is sacrificed for a drive toward efficiency
that is unlikely to be achieved.
From a Hayekian perspective, one might view condemnation for
economic development as a milestone on the road to central planning.'1 °
Posnerians, on the other hand, might simply find a way to dismiss
subjective value and would empower judges to determine which projects
satisfy a simplified cost-benefit analysis. The truth is that judges will rarely
be able to sufficiently determine whether a project will enhance or detract
from social welfare.
Condemnation does not respect autonomy and is unlikely to lead
to real enhancements in social welfare. Therefore, courts should not see
condemnation as the preferred method for overcoming the anticommons
problem.
III. OTHER SOLUTIONS TO THE
ANTICOMMONS PROBLEM
If condemnation is not a feasible way of overcoming the
anticommons problem, it stands to reason that other potential solutions
should be examined. Below, I consider a number of practices that have the
potential to reduce the anticommons problem. While none of these
solutions is likely to be a panacea and each involves tradeoffs affecting
other social goals, the following strategies may be useful in limited
applications.

101. See Hayek, supra note 76, at 40-41 (discussing how suppression of competition through
the government empowerment of syndicalist organizations is the first step toward complete
centralization).
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A. Deregulation
One solution to anticommons problems is to deregulate land use.
As noted above, regulatory disintegration may be the most significant
impediment to economic development of lands. This is true for two reasons.
First, in the modem regulatory state, numerous governmental bodies have
de facto exclusionary rights over land use. Accordingly, developers need a
large number of government approvals to complete a major development
project. One housing development on Staten Island, New York, took twelve
and a half years to complete because permits and approvals were required
from 28 different government agencies.0 2 As a result, one can attribute up
to 35 percent of the cost of a new house to regulatory requirements.0 3
Second, regulators have motives that are different from landowners.
Whereas landowners are likely to be most interested in maximizing the
return from their property, regulators have mixed, and often conflicting,
motives. For instance, a zoning board regulator may be interested in
minimizing neighborhood dissent while shoring up the community's tax
base, while an environmental protection agency regulator may be most
interested in minimizing the effect of new development on environmental
amenities. In either case, both legal rules and the disparate incentives of the
regulators make it more difficult for a developer to purchase the approval
of the regulators. This creates a significant hurdle for developers to
overcome.
If land use were deregulated, the number of governmental entities
having a de facto right to exclude uses on private property would fall
significantly. This reduction or elimination of legal anticommons would
result in improved developer understanding of the development rights they
hold. Additionally, unencumbered by legal anticommons problems,
developers will have more resources available to devote to overcoming the
spatial anticommons problem. Furthermore, the cost of overcoming the
spatial anticommons problem will fall because developers will be able to
employ undisclosed agents to acquire lands with little risk that the
regulatory process will disclose their efforts.
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that deregulation is a
promising method of overcoming the anticommons problem that also
preserves autonomy interests. Nevertheless, this approach begs the
question of what mechanisms can be used to pursue the social goals
addressed by the current regulatory system. One possibility, as Robert
Ellickson has noted, is that governments could beneficially replace zoning

102.

ADVISORY COMM. ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, HUD-5806,

"NOT IN MY BACK YARD": REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 2-13 (1991).
103. Id. at 5.
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law with an upgraded system of nuisance law, covenants, fees, and
standards designed to internalize the externalities created by
development." Ellickson's minimal regulatory system would preclude
legal anticommons through the use of ministerial (emphatically not
discretionary!) enforcement. Ministerial enforcement of environmental
regulations and building codes would also yield a reduction in anticommons problems. Environmental goals could be pursued through a
nondiscretionary and nondiscriminatory fee system, while technical
building codes could be left in place. The creation of norms, enforceable
through social sanctions, would effectively mitigate the harms from the
small nuisances that this type of system is not likely to address."' 5
Despite the academic appeal of a deregulated system, such a system
is unrealistic in modern America. Such sweeping changes would require
both the penalization of powerful, entrenched interests and a sea change in
public opinion. Given that these impediments are not likely to be overcome
any time soon, we must look elsewhere for solutions to the anticommons
problem.
B. Empowering Neighborhood Associations
Another possible solution to the anticommons problem is to replace
public government with private government, existing under the guise of
neighborhood associations. This solution would satisfy some people's need
to operate under a restrictive system of social control while still conferring
to them the advantages of the market. Under this scheme, recently
proposed by Robert Nelson, public zoning would be abolished and current
associations, such as residential community associations, would be
empowered to make their own zoning rules for their members." 6 The use
of community associations has a number of advantages that would likely
mitigate the legal and spatial anticommons problems currently inhibiting
development.
One advantage of neighborhood associations is that, because their
members have contractually agreed to abide by the rules of the association,
those members have voluntarily accepted the risks of that association's land
use rules. At the extreme, an association could retain an option on the land
within its borders to preserve the right to reintegrate the land at a later date
if and when it is efficient to do so. A person buying into such an agreement

104. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 681, 682-83 (1973).
105. See, e.g., ROBERTC. ELLICKSON, ORDERW1THOUTLAw: HOWNEGHORSSETrLE DISPUTES
280-86 (1991).
106. Robert H. Nelson, Privatizingthe Neighborhood:A Proposalto Replace Zoning with Private
Collective PropertyRights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 829 (1999).

Winter 2007]

A COMMON TRAGEDY

could not later complain that the association deprived her of her autonomy
rights when the association exercises its option and acquires the land from
the landowner because the individual has explicitly agreed to abide by the
association's rules. 7 This private solution to the anticommons problem
would preserve autonomy rights, though it is functionally equivalent to
condemnation.
Of course, not all persons would choose to be part of such a
community. As the Tiebout hypothesis suggests, people likely to have high
values for idiosyncratic preferences would choose communities that have
rules that more vigilantly protect an individual's right to use and keep their
property." 8 The net effect is a sorting of persons into different private
communities that reflect their preferences. The price system will efficiently
divert large projects that require the integration of lands to communities in
which the market price for land is closer to the residents' value for their
land.
Another advantage of private associations is that they are not
legally constrained from making community-enhancing decisions to the
same extent that government is. Thus, if a community decides to do so, it
may sell zoning rights on the open market. This would have the effect of
harmonizing the goals of developers and communities. Where an
association is structured in such a way, maximizing wealth will be a
common metric for both the developer and the community. Anticommons
attributable to disparate motivations of the actors involved will not be a
problem in such a case.
Despite the advantages of private associations, a number of
disadvantages still linger. Lee Anne Fennell suggests a number of factors
that may undermine the efficiency and autonomy advantages of Nelson's
scheme."° While many of her concerns are valid, such as her concern over
homeowner ignorance,"' others reflect a misunderstanding of the
economics of risk, such as her concern that homeowner preferences may
change."
Perhaps the biggest problem with Nelson's argument is one that
Fennell did not address. Nelson suggests that current homeowners'
associations or residential groups should be able to secede from local

107. Courts will likely uphold any reasonable association rule. See Hidden Harbour Estates,
Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180,181-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that a condominium
association's alcohol restriction was reasonable, in part because alcohol restrictions "are
widespread throughout both governmental and private sectors").
108. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418
(1956).
109. Lee Anne Fennell, ContractingCommunities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 829-33.
110. See id. at 876-82.
111. See id. at 860-64.
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government zoning rules by some kind of supermajority vote. The problem
with this approach is that it effectively creates the same problem it purports
to remedy. In this case, the perceived well-being of the supermajority
trumps the autonomy rights of those who vote against secession. In
addition, the minority dissenters will have only limited protection from the
courts against the supermajority secessionists."2
Empowering neighborhood associations to perform traditional
municipal functions is a promising advance that could, if properly applied,
advance both efficiency and autonomy interests. However, because these
private organizations will have more flexibility to both help and harm their
members, such associations should only be able to wield power over those
who explicitly consent to be part of such a scheme. Thus, to preserve
autonomy interests, only new neighborhoods and older neighborhoods that
unanimously approve such a governing body should be able to wield
traditionally municipal powers.
C. Regulatory Reform
Although completely replacing the current system of land use
regulation is not a plausible near-term solution, it is probably possible to
reform this system. Two types of regulatory reform are likely to diminish
the anticommons problem. First, the centralization of regulatory functions
in one agency would reduce the regulatory anticommons problem by
decreasing the number of persons with whom the developer would have to
negotiate. Second, the minimization of regulatory discretion would reduce
the power of the regulators to make decisions with exclusionary
consequences.
1. Centralizationof Regulatory Functions
Typically, many distinct governmental agencies handle the
enforcement of land use regulations. For example, the approval of a major
subdivision in Mercer County, New Jersey requires 11 different agency
reviews." 3 While many of these agencies are ultimately accountable to the
local governing body of the community, there is often little overt
coordination between the agencies." 4 Additionally, both state and local

112. See Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317,1324 (N.Y. 1990)
(adopting the business judgment rule for actions of the board of directors of a residential
cooperative).
113. ADVISORY COMM. ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra note 102.
114. See Kayden, supra note 54, at 8-12 (discussing how New York unsuccessfully tried to
overcome the effects of coordination problems between different agencies by offering to
reimburse a developer for incentive bonuses not granted).
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regulatory agencies may have a role in regulating land use."' Finally,
citizens may have either an implied or explicit right of action to enforce
regulations.1 6 If a single regulatory body were in charge of each of these
regulatory functions, a developer would only have to negotiate with one
agency. This would reduce transaction costs. More importantly, because the
local regulatory body would presumably like to maintain a reputation of
being fair to developers to encourage development, centralization of
authority in an agency directly accountable to this body is likely to lead to
more predictable outcomes in navigating the regulatory maze.
Consequently, the centralization of regulatory functions would help to
overcome the legal anticommons caused by the need to obtain development
authorization from many sources.
Nevertheless, this option is probably not workable, and even if it
were it is probably not desirable. There is little chance that local
governments could convince state and federal regulators to delegate the
enforcement power over their land use regulations to a local governmental
agency. Even if the local governments could do this, the concentration of
power in a single agency is likely to lead to corruption of the disparate goals
of the unified agency.
2. Minimization of Discretion
One may also be able to mitigate the anticommons problem by
minimizing the discretion that regulatory agencies have in enforcing land
use regulations such as permitting requirements and zoning restrictions.
While the agency would still have exclusionary power, the application of
that power would be determined in a legislative, rather than quasi-judicial,
manner. An extreme example of this type of system is traditional Euclidian
zoning." 7 In traditional Euclidian zoning, a zoning map is designed to take
into account future growth and will rarely be changed."' Landowners know
that they have a right to develop to the limit of their zoning classification
and no further." 9 Exactions, incentives, and impact fees have no place in
such a system. Instead of leaving land underzoned in "wait-and-see" status,
traditional Euclidian zoning leaves land zoned according to its optimal
future use. The elimination of discretion in such a manner would combat
strategic action by a regulatory agency and lead to more predictable
regulatory decisions. This would allow developers to acquire lands quietly,

115. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987) (discussing the role
of the California Coastal Commission, a state agency, in approving land uses).
116. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
180-88 (2000) (holding that citizens may file claims for violations of certain EPA regulations).
117. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379-81 (1926).
118. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 57, at 104-05.
119. See id.
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confident that the necessary agency would approve their planned
development. Consequently, the cost of overcoming the legal anticommons
problem will be reduced.
On the other hand, the elimination of discretion is not without
costs. Because the regulatory authority is unlikely to have the information
to determine what optimal future use will be, many developments that
would have otherwise increased social welfare will not be pursued in the
first place. Furthermore, it is impossible and impractical to try to foresee all
potential circumstances in advance. It may be very costly to society to
eliminate discretionary devices such as variances. Nevertheless, where
discretion is not likely to have a large effect on welfare, its elimination may
be beneficial due to the expected reduction in the cost of overcoming the
anticommons problem.
D. Nonstationary Development Rights
A final set of options open to localities seeking to minimize
anticommons problems is to engage in the use of nonstationary
development rights. These include the use of floating zones and transferable
development rights. Localities can design these mechanisms for allocating
development rights to introduce flexibility into the land use decision
process without increasing the discretionary power of regulatory agencies.
Because the development rights created by these systems are not fixed to
any piece of land, a developer can acquire land and development rights
separately, thereby decoupling the legal and spatial anticommons that so
often work together to prevent development from occurring.
1. FloatingZones
One nonstationary development right is the "floating zone." 2 ° A
zoning commission wanting to permit a certain level of commercial activity,
but not wanting to mandate where that activity must occur, may create
zones that are not tied to any one piece of land, but instead float over the
entire zoning area until a developer makes a valid application for the
right.121 These are typically set up as special use districts for the specified
uses.1" The advantage of this approach is that it minimizes the risk to a
developer who surreptitiously tries to assemble land using undisclosed
agents. Because zoning ordinances and the comprehensive plan spell out
the conditions for obtaining a special use permit, the developer has a good

120. See Russell R. Reno, Non-Euclidean Zoning: The Use of the FloatingZone, 23 MD. L. REV.
105, 107-10 (1963) (describing the use and legality of floating zones).
121. Id. at 107.
122. Id.
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idea whether the zoning board will approve her application for a special
use permit. Of course, if the regulator has great discretion in issuing such
a permit, the value of this mechanism as a tool to combat anticommons
problems will be minimal. To have a real effect on the anticommons
problem, governments must design floating zones in such a way that the
developer knows whether an attempt to procure a permit will be successful.
Thus, the regulators' decision to grant the application would largely be a
ministerial task, consisting of verifying that the applicant has met certain
objective planning criteria.
2. TransferableDevelopment Rights
A similar and perhaps more promising solution to the anticommons problem is to base development on transferable development
rights (TDRs). As with cluster zoning, regulatory agencies can use TDRs to
satisfy planning goals without requiring that development follow restrictive
zoning criteria. The chief advantage of TDRs over other forms of planning
is that they restrict overall growth in an area without restricting where that
growth will occur. For example, suppose a planner decided that a
community with 100 landowners each owning four-acre parcels of land
would be overbuilt if more than 1,000 units of housing were built. Under
Euclidian zoning, the planner might attempt to achieve her goals by zoning
the land to prohibit more than one house per 0.4 acres. Under cluster
zoning, the planner would allow a landowner to build ten townhouse units
on two acres of land and use the other two acres for a neighborhood park.
With TDRs, the planner can fix the total number of development units at
1,000 units with rights initially allocated to landowners on a pro rata basis.
Each landowner may then sell their rights on the open market. In an
extreme example, 99 of the landowners may choose to sell their rights to the
one-hundredth landowner, who uses her land to build a 1,000-unit high-rise
condominium complex, while the other 99 owners are restricted to use their
land for agricultural purposes.
In the recent case of Barancik v. County of Marin, the Ninth Circuit
upheld a scheme of this sort.1" In Barancik,the court upheld a TDR plan that
distributed development rights on a pro rata basis to the current
landowners.124 The plaintiff challenged the rule because he was unwilling
to pay market price for these rights. Instead, he insisted that the zoning
board give him a rezoning to allow his development to move forward."2
The facts in Barancik illustrate the value of TDRs. Whereas
traditional zoning awards development rights to the first to apply or the

123.
124.
125.

Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834,837(9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 835-37.
Id. at 835-36.
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politically connected, the TDRs at issue in Barancik were subject to market
forces. Because individuals can trade TDRs on the open market, TDRs are
likely to move toward their highest valued use. Also, owners of property
who prefer to wait to develop or are not politically connected will not have
their property values diminished because someone else has decided to
overdevelop in such a way that the zoning board will be unlikely to
approve similar development in the future. These persons may either hold
onto their rights for speculative purposes or sell them to others who wish
to develop.
The implication for the developer of a large project is clear. If the
developer can acquire enough development rights on the open market, the
developer's project is guaranteed zoning approval. If the developer does
not believe the project is worth paying the market price for, the
development will not go forward and the land will be put to a better use.
If the developer acquires the necessary development rights for the project,
the project will move forward as long as the land needed for the
development is acquired within the area covered by TDRs.
TDR programs are likely to significantly mitigate anticommons
problems. First, because TDRs are fungible, there are no anticommons
problems involved in their acquisition. Second, because a zoning board has
no discretionary power under a TDR system, the regulatory anticommons
resulting from the threat of an exercise of the board's power will be
eliminated. Finally, although the spatial anticommons problem still exits,
the likelihood that holdouts will be successful in extorting excess rents will
be reduced because the developer is not tied to development on a particular
set of parcels. On top of these benefits for developers, landowners are
guaranteed both their autonomy rights and the right to pursue the
development value of their lands.
E. Reducing the Anticommons Problem
In this section, I have suggested a number of innovations that
promise to reduce the anticommons problems facing the developers of large
commercial projects. While no single solution may be appropriate in all
cases, a particular community may employ a combination of these
mechanisms to maximize efficiency while simultaneously preserving the
autonomy rights of landowners. In any event, each of the planning tools
examined above is superior to the use of condemnation to overcome the
anticommons problem.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I examined anticommons problems and the methods
available to mitigate the harms from the development of anticommons. I

Winter 2007]

A COMMON TRAGEDY

193

have shown that the increasing use of condemnation for economic
development is a misguided attempt to solve the anticommons problem.
While it may be convenient for local politicians to see anticommons in
subdivided middle class neighborhoods that are coveted by developers
with big dreams and even bigger checkbooks, the use of condemnation as
a remedy is not likely to result in the furtherance of autonomy interests or
broadly defined efficiency interests. Alternatively, efficiency-enhancing
economic development may be encouraged by the mitigation of legal
anticommons inherent in the land use regulatory system. An appropriate
combination of deregulation, private community empowerment, regulatory
reform, and the use of nonstationary development rights can lead to
improved efficiency and a heightened respect for autonomy interests.

